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 Introduction 
With the exception of the introduction of experience-rated premiums, the 
incorporation of the term “insurance” in the title of the 1992 legislation,1 
and the short-lived reforms to the structure of workplace accident 
compensation in 1998, New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme has 
continued to adhere to the principles laid down in the Woodhouse Report.2  
In particular, public monopoly provision, comprehensive coverage and 
mandatory purchase, separation from other segments of the market for 
personal risk (where private insurance companies operate) and cross-
subsidies between different categories of insured risk were explicit 
components of Woodhouse’s conception of the scheme.  Retention of these 
aspects of the scheme has been justified by the claim that accident 
compensation is a component of the social welfare net rather than an 
insurance scheme and that the social welfare approach is superior from the 
point of view of those covered by the scheme.  
 
This paper reviews three of the economic issues raised by the structure of 
our accident compensation scheme: the role of incentives, the relationship 
with the broader insurance market and the costs of government monopoly 
provision.  We use our analysis of these issues to consider the veracity of the 
claim that potential accident victims in New Zealand benefit from our 
adherence to the principles laid out by the Woodhouse Report.  We conclude 
that the current structure of our scheme creates perverse incentives that 
substantially reduce its efficiency while also denying those covered by the 
scheme the potential benefits that would come from consumer choice among 
competing providers offering a broader range of risk products. 
 
Insurance  
The Woodhouse Report treats accidents as exogenous events: that is, it 
views the frequency of accidents as independent of the incentives facing 
                                                 
1 The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. 
2 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation for Personal Injury in New 
Zealand (1967). 
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workers and employers.  Consequently, it argues that meeting the costs of 
accidents is a social responsibility not a matter for which individuals or 
employers should be required to obtain private insurance.  For example, the 
Woodhouse Report stated (at p40) describes the fundamental principle of 
Community Responsibility around which its recommendations are built:  
  
Just as a modern society benefits from the productive work of its 
citizens, so should society accept responsibility for those willing to 
work but prevented from doing so by physical incapacity.  And, since 
we all persist in following community activities, which year by year 
exact a predictable and inevitable price in bodily injury, so should 
we all share in sustaining those who become the random but 
statistically necessary victims.  
 
However, community responsibility is not a principle on which accident 
compensation must be built because accidents satisfy all of the important 
criteria required for the creation of a private insurance market: 
1. Accidents represent an insurable risk because they are more 
predictable in a large sample of the population than they are for any 
individual; 
2. The frequency and value of claims on the accident compensation 
scheme are affected by the incentives for investment in prevention 
and safety, as well as by the incentives of claimants and medical 
professionals to classify illness as resulting from an accident; 
3. The accident compensation scheme can be described in an insurance 
contract; and 
4. It is possible for multiple private insurers to provide the service, that 
is, there is no market failure which requires monopoly public sector 
provision. 
Those who doubt the validity of these arguments need only look to the 
extensive evidence of successful private provision of workplace accident 
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compensation in Australia and the US for confirmation that monopoly 
public provision is unnecessary.3 
 
Since accident insurance of the type provided by the New Zealand scheme 
forms part of the broader market for the insurance of personal risk, 
mandatory separation of accident insurance will raise the cost of obtaining 
personal risk insurance in certain circumstances.  In particular, if there are 
economies of scope in the insurance of different types of personal risk, 
either because of common elements in the risk or common elements in the 
cover and benefits payable, then integration of accident risk into the broader 
insurance market will reduce the costs of insurance.  In addition, the 
purchase of multiple lines of insurance from separate insurers increases 
transactions costs.  This is particularly true when private insurance policies 
such as health and income protection have to be designed to complement the 
cover provided by ACC when it could instead be integrated into a single 
policy.  Thus, the cost of providing insurance is reduced where cover for a 
range of different risks is provided by a single insurer, and in a competitive 
market these cost savings will be passed on to consumers. Consequently, 
consumers are made worse off by separation of accident insurance from the 
broader insurance market, and by provision of the insurance through a 
monopoly state supplier with no power to extend higher levels of, or other 
types of, insurance. 
 
Incentives  
The incentives created by the existence of a no-fault, compulsory accident 
compensation scheme impact on the decisions made by both the insured 
parties and the insurer.  The efficiency of the incentives associated with the 
scheme will have a major impact on the costs of providing the insurance and 
the benefits obtained by insured parties.   
 
                                                 
3 See for example Finkelstein, A. 2002, The Interaction of Partial Public Insurance 
Programs and Residual Private Insurance Markets: Evidence from the U.S. Medicare 
Program, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, number 9031 and 
also Munich Re Group.  2001.  “Workers Compensation: Analysis of Private and Public 
Schemes” at www.munichre.com. 
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All insurance contracts create “moral hazard”.4  In respect of accident 
insurance, moral hazard arises from the fact that insurance reduces the 
incentives of the insured party to avoid the contingency insured against, and 
increases the incentives of the insured party to claim that an accident 
occurred when it did not.  Moral hazard is reduced the higher is the co-
insurance (share of the cost of the accident that is carried by the insured 
party). 
 
The Incentives of the Self-Employed 
An example of the impact of moral hazard is provided by the fact that self-
employed workers have fewer accidents (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1:  Injury per 100,000 workers – self employed versus employed 
(2000/2001)  
 Agriculture Manufacturing Construction Transport 
Self-
Employed 
13,036 5,462 3,623 1,665 
Employed 16,772 17,127 6,322 13,488 
% 
Difference 
28.7% 213.6% 74.5% 710.1% 
 Source: Accident Compensation Corporation 
 
 
Recent European research (detailed in Table 2 below) confirms that overall 
there is a tendency for self-employed individuals to recuperate quicker than 
their employed counterparts, which in turn confirms the presence of the 
incentives for self-employed workers to internalise the costs of injuries.   
 
 
Table 2:  Average number of days absence over last 12 months 
Reason for Absence All Workers Self- Difference 
                                                 
4 In the insurance literature moral hazard refers to the tendency of people with insurance to 
reduce the care that they take to avoid the contingency insured against.  In the economics 
literature moral hazard is used in a consistent but broader way, and refers to all post-
contractual opportunism by one of the parties to the contract. 
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Employed 
Workers 
Occupational Accidents 1.26 0.76 65.8% 
Work-related health 
problems 
1.80 0.86 109% 
Non work related health 
problems 
4.2 2.24 87.5% 
Source:  Paoli, Pascal and Merllie, Damien.  2000.  Third European Survey on Working Conditions. 
 
There are a number of potential explanations for these figures, but all point 
towards perverse-incentives created by accident compensation insurance.  
The higher accident rate for employees may result from the fact that the 
greater compensation and preferential health benefits received via ACC5  
provide employees with incentives to claim all injuries as accidents 
regardless of their actual cause.  However this explanation should apply to 
both employees and self-employed persons.  Another possibility is that there 
are genuinely more accidents involving employees, in which case 
employment environments for employed individuals are significantly less 
safe than those of their self-employed counterparts, or the more accident 
prone members of society self-select away from self-employment.   Finally, 
but perhaps most importantly, the opportunity cost of being off work is 
much higher for a self-employed person than it is for an employee.   The 
incentives resulting from the opportunity cost of time off work would 
explain not only the low accident rates among self-employed, but also the 
relatively low accident rates among high income earners.  
 
The Asymmetry Between Sickness and Accident Benefits  
Another example of inefficient incentives is the asymmetry between benefits 
for victims of illness and accident.  Consider the example of a single 30 year 
old without children.  If she suffers illness as a result of a gradual process, 
such as multiple sclerosis, and it results in her being unable to work 15 
                                                 
5 Treatment within the New Zealand health system is budget constrained and provided on a 
‘needs assessed’ basis, as opposed to treatment within the ACC system, which is not budget 
constrained and based on an entitlement basis.  Thus, typically an injured individual is 
likely to receive quicker treatment when claims are made via ACC, as opposed to the 
traditional health system.  (Source: Ministry of Health). 
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hours or more per week for a period of at least two years, she may be 
eligible for an invalids benefit.6  This entitles her to $196.70 per week.7  
Alternatively, if the same person suffers from a temporary illness, such as 
glandular fever for a period of less than two years, she may be eligible for a 
sickness benefit8, which entitles her to $157.37 per week.9  Now consider 
the situation of the same person who is injured due to an accident, and is 
unable to work as a consequence.  Weekly compensation for personal injury 
under the Act entitles the accident victim to 80% of their pre-injury 
earnings.  The average weekly wages and salaries earned in New Zealand 
were $573 per week before tax for the year ended 30 June 2001.10  After 
deducting tax, compensation provided to the average New Zealander under 
ACC would be $369 per week.  This equates to a 53.3% increase on the 
amount received under an invalids benefit and a 57.1% increase on the 
amount received under a sickness benefit. 
 
The asymmetry between sickness and accident benefits provides strong 
incentives to claim that any disability resulted from an accident.  An 
example of how the incentives effect providers is shown by Figure 1 below.  
This purports to show that between 1992 and 1994 there was a dramatic  
(17.2%) increase in the number of non-fatal injuries in New Zealand.  This 
increase is, however, not due to an increase in the number of accidents: it 
can be explained by changes in institutional arrangements and their impact 
on incentives.  The purchasing arrangements for ACC changed away from 
block funding to funding per accident reported.  These institutional changes 
created an incentive for health providers to report more accidents or to code 
more accident causes. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Provided for under section 40 Social Security Act 1964. 
7 For entitlements, see 
www.winz.govt.nz/get_financial_assistance/benefits/main_benefits/invalids. 
8 Provided for under section 54 Social Security Act 1964. 
9 Supra, n 7. 
10 Source: Statistics New Zealand Household Economic Survey year ended 30 June 2001 
 7
         Figure 1: Injury (Fatal and Non-Fatal) per 100,000 Persons in 
              New Zealand 1988 - 1998 
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Consumer Choice 
 
New Zealand’s ACC scheme is not voluntary: it provides for compulsory 
purchase of a standard policy.  Consequently, this scheme rules out 
consumer choice.  Indeed, consumer choice is so comprehensively excluded 
from the scheme that consumers are not permitted even to make choices 
about the level of insurance above a minimum required level of cover. In 
this section we explore the implications of the absence of consumer choice 
in the ACC scheme. 
 
The “Adequacy” of Entitlements  
In the event of a personal injury, which results in the claimant being 
“incapacitated” in that they are unable to engage in employment, in which 
they were employed before the personal injury occurred,11 the Act entitles 
the claimant to weekly compensation of 80% of their pre-injury earnings.   
The Act and its accompanying regulations also provide for contributions to 
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further ancillary expenses in certain circumstances.  Emergency care and 
                                                 
11 “Incapacity” in terms of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 
2001 is defined in section 103(2).   
ambulance care are paid in full by ACC12.  ACC will pay for acute public 
hospital admissions or non-urgent surgery, unless the claimant chooses a 
private provider who does not have a contract with ACC.  ACC may also 
contribute towards the costs of visits by the claimant to his or her treatment 
provider and may contribute towards part of the fee for common types of 
treatment.  Allowance is also made for contribution towards transport costs 
in certain specified circumstances, set out in the regulations to the 2001 Act.  
The patient must be travelling a specified distance within a specified 
timeframe, or spending a certain amount on public transport per month in 
order to reach the nearest treatment provider.  In such circumstances, the 
ACC will pay a maximum of 28 cents per kilometre, if travelling by private 
motor vehicle, or the public transport fare. 
 
Whether these benefits are considered “adequate” will depend very much on 
he union movement regularly offers examples of situations in which the 
                                                
the propensity of each individual to bear the risk associated with the costs 
that are not covered by ACC.  A single person with no mortgage might find 
80 percent of their pre-accident salary provides an adequate income during 
the period that they cannot work, but a family with children and a mortgage 
may much less easily absorb the 20 percent reduction in post-accident 
income.  In a market that provided choice to consumers, it would be possible 
for consumers to choose whether to insure 80 percent or 90 percent of their 
pre-accident income, and pay a premium commensurate with the level of 
cover that they chose.  Similarly, the adequacy of the benefits will depend 
on whether the person suffering the accident expected to receive substantial 
salary increases in the near future, or was at a point of their career where 
they expected no salary increases or perhaps even to be made redundant. 
 
T
ACC benefits were manifestly inadequate to meet the costs necessarily 
associated with the treatment and rehabilitation of a person who suffered a 
workplace accident.13  Their approach is to argue that benefits and coverage 
 
12 However, ACC will not foot the bill for an ambulance drip, if the claimant is dead on 
e paper by Ross Wilson in this volume. 
arrival. 
13 See th
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should be increased across the board to resolve these problems of inadequate 
cover.  This “all or nothing” solution is inappropriate precisely because 
some workers no doubt have a propensity to bear risk consistent with the 
current scheme, and would rather have higher wages rather than the higher 
ACC benefits suggested by union representatives.  In addition, claims for 
higher benefits rarely take into account the fact that they will result in an 
increase in the moral hazard problems associated with the scheme by 
reducing co-insurance levels and thus giving some workers stronger 
incentives to report accidents and weaker incentives to avoid accidents.  
Better, in our view, would be a scheme that required a minimum level of 
coverage to be purchased but allowed consumer choice beyond that.  This 
would mean that: 
1. Unions could negotiate higher levels of coverage, or coverage for 
2. evels of cover than the compulsory 
 
ompetition 
ecentralisation, Incentives and Choice 
ovider of accident compensation 
events not required under the compulsory scheme, as part of their 
negotiations with the employer. 
Individuals could obtain higher l
or collective contract provided if they wished to do so.  
C
 
D
The ACC is a statutory monopoly pr
insurance in New Zealand.  A state monopoly is the ultimate form of 
centralised decision making.  If decision-making were decentralised, there 
would be more focus on consumers being provided what they actually 
demanded because this is the basis upon which providers compete for 
market share.  Suppliers would also be free to produce the mix of services 
they wanted to.  In an environment with decentralised decision-making, both 
incentives and the discipline provided by competitive tension must be 
present.  This would provide to consumers a menu of choices regarding their 
risk-based premiums and the extent of their cover.  For example, in a private 
market insurance cover for illness or accident and insurance against income 
protection would be intrinsically linked, not separate as under ACC, and the 
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choice of co-insurance level would be used to determine the premium that 
should be paid. 
 
The provision of a menu of insurance options is in marked contrast to the 
ime Inconsistency and Government Provision 
sion of ACC is that it cannot 
 
harles Wilson14 provided support for the idea that government intervention 
                                                
absence of consumer choice associated with social welfare. The absence of 
choice in social welfare schemes follows from the fact that they are 
designed to provide social cohesion by setting minimum income levels for 
all members of society.  They are explicitly not designed either to ensure 
against specific contingencies (it is the absence of adequate income for 
subsistence that is the trigger for a social welfare payment) or to provide 
adequate compensation for cost incurred or income foregone. Further, social 
welfare schemes financed from general taxation revenue have no feasible 
means of allowing members of society to choose higher compensation levels 
and pay higher taxes as a result: there is no necessary relation between taxes 
paid and expected benefits from social welfare schemes in any event.   
 
T
The major problem with public monopoly provi
be time consistent because no government can bind future governments.  
Thus, while full funding of claims is an ongoing regulatory requirement of 
all private insurers, governments always have the option of looting a fully-
funded scheme (for example, by declaring a contribution holiday). 
Similarly, governments may change entitlements even for existing 
beneficiaries, though this would constitute a breach of contract for a private 
insurer.  
 
C
in insurance would be Pareto improving in a situation where there was a 
pooling equilibrium with adverse selection in the private market.  Wilson 
showed that by providing the pooling policy as a compulsory publicly run 
scheme, and allowing individuals to purchase supplementary insurance in 
the private market, there will always be a Pareto improvement.  This theory 
 
14 Wilson, C. 1977. A model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information, Journal of 
Economic Theory, 16, p167-207. 
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however rests on the assumption that individuals can only purchase one 
insurance policy in the private market.  Amy Finkelstein15 considers this 
point and concludes that, 
 
“The government’s capacity for affecting [a] Pareto improvement stems not from 
 
his analysis supports the conclusion of this paper; government intervention 
he competing provider model requires the insurance cover to be specified 
ompetition with Multiple State-Owned Providers 
 is to establish multiple 
maximum.  Advantages of a competing (SOE) model are: 
                                                
its unique capacity to compel participation in an insurance program, but merely 
from its introduction of the potential for individuals to hold multiple insurance 
policies.  Once individuals are allowed to hold multiple private insurance policies, 
the private market equilibrium will always be second-best Pareto efficient and 
government intervention therefore cannot be efficiency-enhancing.” 
T
in the insurance industry via the ACC scheme results in a loss of consumer 
and producer welfare that would be otherwise available in the private 
market. 
 
T
as a contract and claimants could sue the provider for non-delivery of 
appropriate services.  Claimants under this model would have an incentive 
to monitor their provider and it would also be more time consistent than the 
current situation (it is more difficult to breach a contract than it is to change 
legislation).  There are numerous options to solve the problems of a state 
monopoly provider.   
 
 
C
An option for those opposed to private ownership
state-owned providers to compete against each other creating a competitive 
market while still in government ownership.  Some of the benefits of this 
model include that the providers would behave as full cover insurers and 
they would be free to respond to consumer demand and facilitate consumer 
choice.  The legislation could also specify a minimum insurance cover, not a 
 
15 Finkelstein, A. 2002, When can Partial Public Insurance Produce Pareto Improvements? 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, Number 9035. 
 12
 • Explicit contracts which are enforceable and thus provide greater 
certainty than a legislated benefit regime; 
re among the competing 
• 
• subject to the Commerce, Fair Trading and Consumer 
course for breach of 
 
This m  private providers in the insurance market.  
ompetition with SOEs is feasible where as it is impossible under the 
ccidents are just one component of the risk faced by individuals.  
cident insurance from the broader private insurance market 
Zealand 
 inefficient: the perverse incentives and moral hazard problems associated 
• Decision-making is decentralised, and consumers receive the 
benefits of competition for market sha
providers; 
Full funding of claims becomes more credible; 
SOEs are 
Guarantees Acts, so consumers have legal re
contract or existing law. 
odel has implications for
C
current regime.  The private insurers would have access to the 80 percent of 
the personal risk market current monopolised by the Accident Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Insurance Corporation.  The threat of the SOEs 
undertaking a broader range of business would be a competitive threat for 
the private providers. 
  
Conclusions 
A
Separating ac
raises costs that are ultimately borne by consumers.   In addition, the 
absence of consumer choice in respect of the insurer and the level of 
insurance cover (above the minimum level) raises the total cost of the full 
insurance cover required by individuals.  Monopoly provision reduces 
consumer welfare even when the monopoly is government owned.   
 
The current structure of the accident compensation scheme in New 
is
with the scheme are illustrated by the differential between accident rates for 
employees and the self-employed in the same industries.  A scheme that 
allowed competing providers, and individual and group choice, and that 
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addressed the incentives associated with current scheme, would deliver 
greater long-term benefits to all potential victims of accidents in New 
Zealand. 
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